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Abstract 
 
Do foreign banks have an advantage operating abroad? The existing literature has come up 
with different answers. Studying the performance of foreign banks relative to domestic banks 
in a large number of countries between 1999 and 2006, we find that the answer importantly 
depends on a number of factors. Specifically, foreign banks tend to perform better when from 
a high income country and when competition in the host country is limited. They also perform 
better when they are large and rely more on deposits for funding. Foreign banks improve their 
performance over time, possibly as they adapt to the local institutional environment. Foreign 
banks from home countries geographical or cultural close to the host country perform better 
than distant foreign banks. Institutional familiarity, however, does not help (improve) foreign 
banks’ performance. These findings show that it is important to control for heterogeneity 
among foreign banks when studying their performance and help reconcile some contradictory 
results found in the literature.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Banking has increasingly become more globalized, driven by deregulation, advances in 
communications and technology, and more general economic integration. Especially, foreign 
bank entry has increased sharply in the last few decades. As a result, policy makers and 
academics are keenly interested in the functioning of foreign banks in host countries. Existing 
studies that compare the performance of foreign banks to that of domestic banks have, 
however, found different results. One reason for these differences may be that whether being 
a foreigner is a liability or an asset depends on particular foreign bank’s characteristics and 
local market conditions that influence the bank’s ability to do business in a particular host 
country. However, few studies have tried to analyze the role of such factors. This paper 
attempts to shed light on some key factors.  
Foreign banks can have a number of advantages compared to domestic banks. By 
servicing clients active in more than one country, they may achieve efficiency gains. In 
addition, they may achieve benefits from spreading best-practice policies and procedures over 
more than one country. Furthermore, they might be able to diversify risk better, allowing them 
to undertake higher risk, but also higher return investments. For example, foreign banks may 
have advantages in the form of more diversified funding bases, including having access to 
external liquidity from their parent banks, which may lower their funding costs. By being 
larger, they may achieve other scale advantages; for example, they may be able to afford more 
sophisticated models giving them superior risk management skills.  
At the same time, foreign banks are likely to incur additional costs and face more 
barriers compared to domestic banks. They may have less information compared to local 
banks on how to do business in the host country, putting them at a disadvantage, at least until 
they have been in the country for some time. Furthermore, foreign banks might be exposed to 
discrimination by host country government and customers. And diseconomies might arise 
because of difficulties operating and monitoring from a distance or in an institutional 
environment that is culturally different. Depending on which effects are stronger, foreign 
banks may perform better or worse compared to domestic banks in the host country.  
Empirically, the existing literature is ambivalent on the relative performance of foreign 
banks.1 Table 1 summarizes the results of some 35 studies on the performance of foreign 
                                               
1
 As well as on the contribution of foreign banks to overall financial sector development, access to financial 
services, financial stability, but those aspects are not analyzed here 
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banks. The ambiguity found in the literature is clearly demonstrated in the variation across 
studies on the findings of foreign banks’ performance. A total of 15 studies found that foreign 
banks perform better than domestic banks on all performance measures, while 9 studies found 
worse or no statistically significant difference on all measures. The other studies were 
ambiguous as on some measures foreign banks performed better than domestic banks and on 
others worse or equal. 
Some of these differences in results may reflect differences in sample periods and 
country coverage. From Table 1 it is clear that, among the studies reviewed, there exists a 
wide variety in country coverage, from many single country studies to broader cross-country 
studies, and varying sample periods. Studies focusing on the US found that foreign owned 
banks perform significant worse than domestic banks (see, among others, DeYoung and Nolle 
1996, and Mahajan, Rangan and Zardkoohi 1996). Using data from other industrialized 
countries, however, studies have documented that foreign banks perform better (Sturm and 
Williams 2004) or that no differences between foreign and domestic banks exist (Vander 
Vennet 1996). When studying foreign banks in developing countries, a number of studies 
have found that foreign banks outperform domestic banks (Grigorian and Manole 2006; 
Berger, Hasan and Zhou 2009). Others, however, have found the opposite result (Nikiel and 
Opiela 2002; Yildirim and Philippatos 2007) or no significant difference between domestic 
and foreign banks (Crystal, Dages and Goldberg 2001; Mian 2003).  
 Differences in results also reflect varying performance measures and econometric 
techniques used. Table 1 shows the variety in performance measures: some studies have used 
profitability measured in various ways, like profit before taxes as share of assets, net income 
after taxes as ratios of the book amount of equity (ROE) or of assets (ROA). Also, non-
performing loans, loan growth, operational cost (to income) or other efficiency, and market 
valuation measures have been used as performance measures. These measures, however,  
capture quite different aspects, such as the bank’s performance with respect to profitability, 
stability or the efficiency with which it uses inputs. Furthermore, specific econometric 
techniques used have varied, from simple two-way comparisons to using regressions 
controlling for some bank and country characteristics.  
The differences in countries, time periods and measures studied could explain the 
variety in findings. Although hard to tell, this unlikely explains all differences, however. 
Differences likely also reflect that in general studies do not account for the diversity among 
foreign banks and the circumstances under which they operate. Diversity exists in a number of 
dimensions. For one, several studies suggest that home and host country characteristics play 
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an important role in performance. Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) find that, for the 
five industrialized countries they study, the performance of foreign banks compared to their 
domestic counterparts depends on the country of origin of the foreign bank. Claessens, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) and Micco, Panizza and Yanez (2007) find that foreign 
banks tend to have lower profits than domestic banks in developed countries, but the opposite 
in developing countries, suggesting that the advantages of being foreign do not offset the costs 
as much in industrialized compared to in developing countries. Using data for 13 (mostly 
developed) host countries, Miller and Parkhe (2002) find some evidence that the performance 
of a foreign bank is influenced by the competitiveness of both home and host countries.  
 In addition to home and host country characteristics, cultural, geographical or 
institutional distance might impact the relative performance of foreign banks. Distance in the 
various dimensions between borrower and lender increases not only transaction costs, but also 
the information problems a bank faces in its lending decisions and therefore likely affects its 
profitability. Mian (2006) finds that foreign banks that are geographically close to the host 
country are better able to deal with local (soft) information. Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) 
find similar results, with foreign banks with parents in other Latin American countries more 
likely to lend to small, informational opaque Argentine firms than other foreign banks do. 
Correa (2008) finds that in industrialized countries the post-acquisition performance of cross-
border banks is higher when host and home country share the same language but lower when 
they share the same legal system. And, as an example from capital markets on the importance 
of distance, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that fund managers are better equipped to earn 
substantial abnormal returns in geographical more proximate investments.   
Bank characteristics likely play a role as well. Size can be an important factor in 
determining bank performance (see Berger 2007 for a review of the literature on economies of 
scale). And it has long been documented that funding and asset mixes affect bank 
performance (e.g., Berger and Mester, 1997). Also the amount of time the foreign bank has 
already been present in the host country can be important as an indicator how well it may 
have adjusted to the local institutional environment.  
There have been some papers that have highlighted these differences and pointed 
towards some explanations, but few have tried to do it comprehensively. To analyze these 
factors more completely requires a large data set of foreign and domestic banks, preferably in 
a panel format, with a broad spectrum of home-host combinations, diversity in bank 
characteristics, etc. At the same time, the list of factors to include and control for has to 
remain manageable. This study does so. 
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By examining the relative performance of foreign banks, as measured in terms of 
profitability, in a large group of countries over the period 1999-2006 in a regression 
framework including these factors, we systematically analyze which factors have an important 
impact on the advantage or disadvantage of being foreign. The large number of countries in 
our database enables us to exploit the variation in host country and home country 
characteristics and the distance between the two. The use of bank characteristics allows us to 
control for and study key bank characteristics that can play a role in performance. In addition, 
the panel structure of our data allows us to disentangle possible differences in short and long-
term effects of foreign ownership. We find that the location of the parent bank, the 
competitiveness in the host country, the geographical and cultural distance between host and 
home countries, and the bank’s size and time it has been present in the country, as well as its 
funding structure, are important factors explaining the relative performance of foreign banks.  
Our work adds to the literature in several ways. Most importantly, it extends the 
literature on the performance of foreign banks by documenting some of the factors that impact 
a foreign bank’s ability to operate in a host country. As such, it provides an explanation for 
some of the contradicting results found in the literature. Second, by studying how distance 
influences the performance of foreign banks, our study contributes to the rapidly increasing 
literature on the impact of distance on the activities and performance of financial 
intermediaries. This includes studies that find evidence of the considerable impact of distance 
on international investment decisions (Buch 2003), loan rates (DeGryse and Ongena 2005), 
lending decisions (Mian 2006) and bank branching (Grosse and Goldberg 1991). Third, most 
studies focus only on one or a small group of (developed or developing) countries, with some 
notably exceptions, such as Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) and Micco, 
Panizza and Yanez (2007), whereas our results reflect evidence from a large number of 
countries. Fourth, we explicitly analyze the impacts of some specific bank characteristics. 
Especially the dynamics behind the performance of foreign banks has received limited 
attention in the literature, with a few notable exceptions (such as Majnoni, Shankar and 
Varhegyi 2003 and Berger, Clarke, Cull, Klapper and Udell 2005).  
We organize the rest of the paper as follows. The next section reviews the theoretical 
predictions regarding the factors that will affect the advantages and disadvantages of being 
foreign and the resulting impact of being foreign on performance. Section 3 introduces the 
data and discusses the empirical methodology we employ. Section 4 shows and discusses the 
empirical results. Section 5 concludes.  
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2. Theoretical predictions and related literature 
 
If the advantages of being foreign outweigh the disadvantages, foreign banks should 
outperform domestic banks. If the opposite is the case, domestic banks should perform better 
than their foreign counterparts. As some previous studies find different results this may be 
because a number of factors influence the extent to which being foreign is an asset or a 
liability. The literature provides suggestions for several factors that could potentially have an 
impact.  
 
Home country characteristics  
Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell (2000) find for a number of OECD countries that on 
average domestic banks are more efficient than foreign banks are but that these aggregate 
results mask considerable heterogeneity across foreign banks. Their results suggest that only 
some banks from a limited number of countries with specific favorable market or 
regulatory/supervisory conditions can outperform domestic banks in their host countries. They 
however do not provide an answer as to which home market conditions might give these 
banks an advantage.  
A first factor that might have a positive impact on the performance of a foreign bank is 
the overall development of the home market. For example, the fact that the labor force is 
highly educated makes it easier for a bank to adopt new risk management techniques, new 
financial instruments and new technologies (Berger, DeYoung, Genay and Udell 2000). 
Furthermore, more advanced countries in general will have well developed regulatory 
systems, including a relatively strong safety net. This allows banks to undertake higher risk-
higher return projects, including investing in another country.  
In addition, the degree of competition in the home country might provide foreign 
banks with an advantage in their host country. As in other industries, the degree of 
competition in the financial sector can affect the efficiency of the production of services, the 
quality of products, and the degree of innovation in that sector. A bank that has learned to 
work in a competitive environment with demanding customers in its home country has 
learned to innovate, pursue new business segments and adjust to changing circumstances 
(Aghion and Howitt 1998). Greater competition at home can thus lead to more efficient 
operations abroad.  
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Host country characteristics  
In some type of countries it might be easier for foreign banks to acquire market share and thus 
perform better. As Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2001) point out in countries 
where the banking sector is inefficient, banking practices are outmoded and credit is not 
allocated based on commercial criteria, foreign banks might be able to reap higher profits than 
domestic banks. In addition, the development of the financial sector could have an impact on 
the performance of a foreign bank. In a country where a large part of the population does not 
yet have access to financial services it is easier to gain market share and therefore likely easier 
to make a higher profit. In contrast, in countries with a well developed banking sector, both 
domestic and foreign participants may be sophisticated. Even when foreign banks have 
technical advantages, they might not be enough to offset the informational disadvantages they 
face relative to domestic banks. Furthermore, in a market that is highly competitive it might 
be more difficult for a foreign bank to outperform domestic banks operating in the country as 
profit margins are small.  
 
Distance  
Distance might also have an impact on the benefits and costs of being foreign. The theory of 
financial intermediation (Diamond 1984, Boyd and Prescott 1986, Boot and Thakor 1997) 
builds on the notion that intermediaries serve to reduce transaction costs and information 
asymmetries. However, the severity of the asymmetric problem itself may be a function of 
distance (Hauswald and Marquez 2006). As such, it would be harder to make profitable 
investments when distance is large. Results from Coval and Moskowitz (2001) support this 
idea. They find that in the mutual funds sector, where information is a lot less opaque and 
agency issues less severe compared to banking, managers still earn substantial abnormal 
returns in investments that are geographically close.  
Distance can also impact a foreign bank’s performance as it may impede the flow of 
information within the bank. In a theoretical model, Stein (2002) shows that greater distance 
decreases the incentives of a bank manager to collect soft information. Mian (2006), using 
data for Pakistan, tests this theory, arguing that distance is especially large for foreign banks 
as loan officer and CEO reside in different countries. He shows that greater cultural distance 
makes it more costly for foreign banks to collect and communicate soft information. Similar 
Berger, Klapper and Udell (2001) find that foreign banks that are culturally close have less 
problems extending loans to opaque small Argentine firms than culturally distant foreign 
banks. These results suggest that distance can have a potentially strong impact on the 
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performance of foreign banks. Especially when bank activities require local knowledge (like 
local deposit taking or lending to SMEs) it can be expected that domestic banks that are 
familiar with local customs and better equipped to work with (soft) information outperform 
foreign banks.  
Finally, distance can affect the performance of a foreign bank as it may increase the 
cost of management or reduce efficiency in other ways. Berger and DeYoung (2001, 2006) 
find that distance determines the effectiveness of internal control mechanisms within bank 
holding companies. In addition, research on the barriers faced by foreign owned institutions 
suggests that distance and cultural differences deter cross-border M&As (Buch and DeLong 
2004).  
In summary, theory predicts that distance between host and home country has a 
negative impact on the performance of a foreign bank compared to its domestic counterparts. 
Information availability in the host country, experience and bank activities may affect the 
strength with which distance influences performance.  
 
Bank characteristics  
Size and other bank characteristics have been found to be important for explaining 
performance of any bank. Studies have found differences between small and large banks, 
driven in part by different economies of scale and the fact that such banks operate in different 
niches, leading to differences in performance (see Berger and Humphrey 1997 for a review).  
Ownership structures and other corporate governance aspects have been found to affect bank 
performance (Laeven and Levine, 2008). And funding and asset mix have been used as 
control variables as they can affect performance. For our study, one other important aspect is 
how long the foreign bank has been present in the host country. This can be expected to make 
a difference on the bank’s current performance. For example, if there are set-up costs, 
including learning of the local environment, performance may become better over time.  
 
3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
 
Basic Data Description 
We use a newly constructed database on bank ownership (see Claessens, Van Horen, 
Gurcanlar and Mercado 2008 for a complete description of the database). The database 
contains ownership and balance sheet information of banks in all developing countries over 
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the period 1995-2006.2 The coverage is comprehensive, with in the latter part of the period 
banks included roughly accounting for 90 percent or more of the banking system assets in 
each country. The database includes all currently and past active commercial banks that are or 
have been reporting to Bankscope during the sample period.3 For each bank, we determine the 
year of its establishment and, if applicable, the year it became inactive. We treat mergers and 
acquisitions carefully to avoid double counting.  
An important feature of the database is that for each year the bank is active over the 
period 1995-2006 its ownership is determined. Furthermore, if a bank is foreign owned, the 
country of residence of the owner is tracked. As such the database allows us to look at the 
impact of home and host country characteristics as well as linkages between these countries 
on the performance of foreign banks. We use the definition generally applied in the literature 
on foreign banking (e.g., Clarke, Cull, Martinez Peria and Sanchez 2003; Claessens, 
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2001) and consider a bank as foreign owned if 50 percent or 
more of its shares is owned by foreigners. To determine the home country of ownership, we 
sum the percentages of shares held by foreigners by the country of residence, with the country 
with the highest percentage of shares then considered the home country. Ownership is based 
on direct ownership, i.e., we do not consider indirect ownership. However, when the direct 
owner is an entity just established for tax purposes, we do not use the direct, but rather the 
relevant next level of ownership. 
To track ownership and changes therein we use as our primary source information 
available in Bankscope. We complement this information, however, with information from 
several other sources, including individual banks’ websites and annual reports, parent 
companies websites, banking regulatory agency/Central Bank websites, reports on corporate 
governance, local stock exchanges, SEC’s Form F-20, and country experts. Through extensive 
searches we are able to obtain ownership information for almost 95 percent of the banks in 
our sample for the entire period in which they were active.4 Balance sheet information of the 
banks in the database is collected from Bankscope. 
                                               
2
 The databases does not include countries with less than five active banks in Bankscope. The cutoff of 2006 
avoids any inference from the 2007-08 global financial crisis. 
3
 The full database also includes saving banks, cooperatives, bank holding companies and long term credit banks, 
however to keep the banks in the database as homogeneous as possible we only use commercial banks in this 
paper. Commercial banks account for 90% of all the banks in the database.  
4
 While our coverage is good, there are data limitations. For example, some foreign shareholders are trusts that 
hold shares on behalf of investors, which may or may not be foreigners, but available data do not provide this 
information. 
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Although the database covers almost all developing countries, for our purposes it is 
preferable to only use a subset of countries. When testing how ownership affects performance 
in a multi-country setting one has to deal with an endogeneity problem. The decision of a 
bank to enter a certain country is conditional on the state of the local market (structure and 
concentration of the banking system, general profitability, quality of regulation and 
supervision, the contracting environment, etc.). As such, a selection bias can exist with 
foreign banks seeking out those markets where they can operate best. Most of this bias, 
however, can be overcome by including country control variables and having a control group 
of local banks. Therefore, in order to limit the endogeneity bias, we only include countries 
that are sufficiently open for foreign entry (at least 3 foreign banks are active over the entire 
sample period) and for which there is a large enough control group of domestic banks (at least 
3 domestic banks are active over the entire sample period). These two conditions would limit 
our sample to only 33 countries. However, if we shorten the time period from 1999-2006 our 
subsample includes 51 countries.5 By shortening the time period we do not lose much 
information as balance sheet information is rather scarce between 1995 and 1999. Our results 
are robust to different samples though (results available upon request). 
 Table 2 provides a list of all the countries in our sample. Even when using a sub-
sample our database includes a wide variety of income levels. Ten countries are low income, 
26 lower middle income and 15 countries are upper middle income countries.6 The table 
shows the size of the banking system of each country in terms of number and total assets in 
1999 and 2006. In addition, it shows the relative importance of foreign banks in the country. 
Countries vary substantially in size of the financial system and importance of foreign banks. 
In 1999 the number of banks ranges from the minimum number of 6 in Angola to 226 in 
Russia. In 2006 Cameroon and Trinidad and Tobago have the smallest number of banks (9), 
while Russia is still front runner with 203 banks. The relative size of the banking sector and 
its growth over time in terms of assets should be interpreted carefully as asset information is 
not always available (especially in 1999). Based on our information, Tanzania has the 
smallest and China the largest banking sector in 1999. In 2006, Armenia has the least assets 
while China again topped all countries with a vast margin. In terms of number of banks, the 
relative importance of foreign banks ranges in 1999 from 9% (India and Serbia and 
                                               
5
 Zimbabwe also qualified, but as the economic situation in this country deteriorated so rapidly in the last few 
years we exclude it from the sample.  
6
 As defined by the World Bank in 2006.  
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Montenegro) to 81% (Hungary) and in 2006 from 10% (China) to 84% (Hungary and 
Romania). In terms of assets the relative importance of foreign banks ranges in 1999 from 0% 
(which indicates missing information, i.e., is fictive) to 93% in Hungary. In 2006 the assets of 
foreign banks surpass 90% of total assets in four Eastern European countries (Bosnia & 
Herzegovina, Croatia, Hungary and Romania).  
 
Home and host country characteristics 
To capture the overall level of development of the home and host country we use GDP per 
capita (gdpcap). In addition, to see if it matters whether the parent bank is located in a high-
income or a developing country we construct a dummy variable developing. This dummy is 
one if the foreign bank is from a developing country and zero if from a high income country. 
The division between developing and high income is based on the World Bank classification 
in 2006. To capture potential differences between the performance of foreign banks in low 
income and middle income countries we construct a dummy variable low which is one if the 
host country is a lower income country based on World Bank 2006 definitions. To measure 
financial development (findev) in the host country we use a simple measure often applied in 
the literature: M2 divided by GDP.  
Measuring competition, however, is less straightforward. As Claessens and Laeven 
(2004) point out competitiveness of an industry cannot be measured by market structure 
indicators or performance measures alone. In order to capture the degree of effective 
competition it is preferable to use a structural model. As such we use their measure of 
competitiveness: the H-statistic based on the Panzar Rosse (1987) methodology. The Panzar 
Rosse H-statistic is calculated per country from reduced-form bank revenue equations and 
measures the sum of the elasticities of the total revenue of the banks with respect to their input 
prices. H<0 indicates a monopoly, H=1 reflects perfect competition and 0<H<1 indicates 
monopolistic competition. As calculation is very data intensive the H-statistic is not time-
varying and can only be calculated for a select number of countries (50 in total). As a result, 
in the regressions where we examine the impact of competition in host and home country on 
the performance of foreign banks our sample will be reduced. For the exact calculation of the 
H-statistics and the countries for which the statistic is available, see Claessens and Laeven 
(2004).  
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Measuring Distance  
There are different ways one can measure distance. The measure most commonly used in the 
literature captures geographical or cultural distance.7 We proxy this type of distance by two 
dummies. Following Mian (2006) one of the dummies, samereg, equals one if host and home 
country are located in the same region (as defined by the World Bank).8 The other, comlang, 
equals one if both countries share the same language 
Distance can also be measured by the difference in institutional quality between host 
and home country. As banking is a highly institutionally sensitive activity, familiarity to deal 
with the institutional environment likely affects the ease with which a bank can use available 
information. A number of studies have found that institutional similarity matters in the 
location decisions of foreign banks (Galindo, Micco and Serra, 2003; Claessens and Van 
Horen 2008). We create a dummy variable, instfam, that captures institutional distance 
between home and host countries. The variable is based on the governance indicators of 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (KKM, 2008). The KKM-indicators measure six dimensions 
of institutional quality: (1) voice and accountability, (2) political instability and violence, (3) 
government effectiveness, (4) regulatory quality, (5) rule of law and (6) control of corruption. 
For each dimension, indexes range from -2.5 to 2.5 with higher values indicating a better 
institutional environment.9 We take the simple average of these six governance indicators and 
then calculate the absolute difference between the institutional quality in host and home 
country. When the difference between host and home country is smaller than the median 
difference instfam has a value one, if it is higher it is zero. We expect the relative performance 
of foreign banks to be better when geographical and cultural or institutional distance between 
host and home country is small.  
 
 
 
                                               
7In general geographical distance is highly correlated with cultural difference, so we treat geographical and 
cultural distance as synonym.  
8
 The World Bank categorizes developing countries in six regions, that is Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and Northern Africa, East Asia and Pacific and 
South Asia. We employ these same regions and add one: high income-OECD countries. This leaves us with a 
group of non-developing non-OECD countries. These countries are added to one of the regions based on their 
location.  
9
 The measures are currently collected on an annual basis, but before 2002 only on a bi-annual basis. We use the 
value of the previous year for the years in which no indicator is available.  
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Bank level data 
We look at a number of bank level variables: size, funding structure, asset structure and age. 
For each variable (except age) we determine the median across all (foreign and domestic) 
banks and create a dummy which is one if the specific bank is above the median value and 
zero otherwise. Then we interact these variables with the ownership of the bank to create four 
different groups. For example, in the case of size we have different dummies for small 
domestic banks, large domestic banks, small foreign banks and large foreign banks. In 
addition, for age we create two categories: old and new banks and similarly interact these 
dummies with the ownership of the bank. We measure size of the bank by the share of the 
domestic banking market it captures (share). Funding structure is captured by ratio of deposits 
to liabilities (deposit) and asset structure by the loan to asset ratio (loan). For age (age), we 
use a cutoff of 8 years to create the old and new categories. Table 3 reports the summary 
statistics of all the variables employed in the empirical specifications.10  The Appendix Table 
1 provides a complete description of all variables used. 
 
Empirical methodology 
There are several dimensions by which to study the performance of foreign banks. We opt for 
a very straightforward one and study the impact of bank ownership on the profitability (as 
measured by profit before taxes divided by total assets) of a bank. More specifically we use a 
panel model relating performance to bank ownership, the abovementioned interaction 
variables and a number of controls. We use country-year fixed effects to control for 
unobserved country characteristics that are allowed to vary over time. This way we can 
estimate whether in a given country foreign banks tend to outperform domestic banks. Our 
model thus already controls for those country characteristics that have proven to have 
explanatory power for bank performance, such as the general level of development, financial 
depth, banking market structure, the quality of information infrastructure, property rights and 
aspects of macro-economic policy of the country. Furthermore, this way we control for 
(country dependent) variation in profitability over time due to, for example, interest rate 
cycles and macroeconomic cycles.  
We do, however, include a number of bank level controls. We include, as continuous 
variables instead as dummies, the bank characteristics share, loan and deposits. In addition, 
                                               
10
 We do not have summary statistics for the age of the bank as we do not know the exact age of the foreign 
banks that entered the country before 1995.   
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we control for the leverage of the bank (leverage) defined as equity divided by assets. 
Furthermore, we include a dummy (public) which is one if a domestic banks is majority 
owned by the government as to control for the fact that government owned banks tend to be 
relatively weak performers. Finally, we include a dummy variable, problembank, which is one 
if the bank (foreign or domestic) has exited the market within four years after entry.11 Banks 
that exit the market soon after entry are likely banks that have underperformed. Not correcting 
for this could potentially bias the estimation. 
To summarize, we test what factors affect the profitability of foreign banks using the 
following specification:  
ictictictictictict XFOwnOwn εγββα ++++=∏ '* 1210  (1) 
 
where ict∏ is profitability of bank i, in country c at year t. j indicates the home country of the 
foreign bank. Own is the ownership dummy, which is one if the bank is foreign owned. ictF  
represents one of the factors (distance, home or host country characteristics) that might 
explain the differential impact of foreign ownership on profitability. ictX is a vector of bank 
level variables. We estimate the model using OLS. All standard errors are robust and allow 
for clustering at the country level. We weigh the observations with the weights equal to the 
inverse of the number of banks in the host country to prevent any bias due to differences in 
market size. Since in the first years after starting up a bank or acquiring an existing bank the 
profitability likely is affected by start-up costs we exclude observations in the first 2 years the 
(foreign or domestic) bank is active or acquired.  
 
 
4. Empirical Results 
 
Individual country regression 
Before examining which factors can explain the cost of being foreign, we first look at 
individual country results. This enables us to see if indeed differences exist between countries 
with respect to the performance of foreign banks. For the individual country regressions we 
apply model (1) without country-year fixed effects but with year fixed effects  
                                               
11
 For the banks that entered after 2002 we do not know whether they are “problem” banks or not. In our 
regressions we err on the side of caution and include these banks in the group of “problem” banks. However, our 
results are robust to including these banks in the group of normal banks.  
 15 
Results are summarized in Table 4. The table divides the countries in our sample in 4 
groups. The first group (upper left quadrant) consists of countries for which the impact of 
ownership is positive and significant. In these countries foreign banks are on average more 
profitable than domestic banks. The second group (upper right quadrant) contains countries 
with a positive but insignificant parameter for ownership. Countries in which domestic banks 
tend to outperform foreign banks (negative and significant sign for ownership) are located in 
the lower left quadrant. The last group (lower right quadrant) displays those countries for 
which ownership has a negative but insignificant sign.  
The table indicates that in our group of 51 countries, all four cases occur. Foreign 
banks are performing better than domestic banks in 14 countries and worse in 8 countries. In 
the majority of countries there does not seem to be a significant difference between domestic 
and foreign banks. Of this group ownership has a positive sign in 14 countries and a negative 
sign in 15 countries.  
These results reinforce the results of previous studies: when looking at aggregate data 
there is no straightforward relationship between bank ownership and performance. Apparently 
under some conditions being a foreigner is an asset, in some cases it is a liability and 
sometimes ownership just does not matter. In the next section we investigate which factors 
have an impact on the relative performance of foreign banks.  
 
Foreignness and home and host country characteristics 
We pool all countries together and test whether the impact of foreign ownership is dependent 
on certain factors, starting with home and host country characteristics. The results are 
provided in Table 5. The first column of the table shows that, if we do not differentiate 
between different types of foreign banks, we find no impact of foreign ownership on 
profitability.  
 However, as soon as we allow for heterogeneity with respect to home and host country 
we see that foreign ownership does matter. When looking at home country characteristics we 
find strong evidence that the level of development of the country in which the parent company 
is located influences the performance of foreign banks since we find a significant and positive 
effect when interacting ownership with GDP per capita of the home country. The significance 
of the income effect becomes even stronger when we split home countries in high-income 
versus developing countries. We find that foreign banks outperform domestic banks when the 
parent is located in a high-income country. However, when the parent is located in a 
developing country a foreign bank performs significantly worse than a domestic bank. This 
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suggests that technical and regulatory advances of foreign banks from high income countries 
make it easier for these banks to make profitable investments in developing countries. One 
could argue that these results are driven by the fact that foreign banks from high-income 
countries tend to be larger than foreign banks from developing countries and that it is scale, 
not home country development that matters for the difference in profitability. However, when 
we control for the scale of foreign banks, our results do not change (see Table 7).  
 Competition in the foreign bank’s home country does not affect the performance of the 
bank. However, competition in the host country does have an impact. We find that when 
competition in the host country is limited foreign banks are more likely to outperform 
domestic banks. This is not surprising. When competition is limited it will be easier for a bank 
to generate excess returns and thus make a larger profit. Other host country characteristics 
(the level of overall and financial sector development) do not matter much for the relative 
performance of a foreign bank. 
 When we combine both significant factors (developing country foreign bank and 
competition in the host country) in one regression (last column) we find that both results keep 
their significance, suggesting that both factors matter. Looking at the economic relevance of 
our findings we see that they are important. A foreign bank from a high income country 
investing in the host country with lowest competition (Turkey) earns on average a profit 
before tax of 0.72 higher than a domestic bank.12 This is equal to 44 percent of the mean 
profitability. Similarly, this same bank in a country with strongest competition (Costa Rica) 
earns on average a profit before tax of 0.70 less than a domestic bank. A foreign bank from a 
developing country, on the other hand, earns on average 0.18 less compared to a domestic 
bank in the host country with lowest competition and 1.60 less in the host country with 
highest competition.  
 In terms of control variables, we see that they are in almost all cases very consistent 
across the regressions. Large banks tend to be more profitable than smaller banks. Banks that 
have a larger loan ratio and banks with limited leverage (high share of equity in assets) also 
tend to be on average more profitable. Domestic banks that are majority government owned 
are less profitable compared to private banks. Finally, banks that exited the market within the 
first four years after entering are on average less profitable. None of these results are very 
surprising.  
                                               
12
 The minimal level of competition in our sample of host countries is 0.46. This value times 3.106 and 
subtracted from 2.157 equals 0.72.  
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Foreignness and Distance 
When testing for the impact of distance on the performance of foreign banks it is important to 
control for the home and host country characteristics that have an important impact on foreign 
bank performance. Especially it is important to control for the level of development when 
using region in which home and host country are located as proxy for geographical and 
cultural distance. After all, as all host countries are developing countries only a very small 
group of foreign banks from high-income countries (in effect only the non-OECD high-
income countries) will be located in the same region. So without correcting for level of 
development of the home country, the dummy samereg will not only capture the impact of 
being geographically close but also the impact of being from a developing country.  
 As is clear from the results in Table 5, competition in the host country is also an 
important factor affecting a foreign bank’s profitability. We do, however, not include this 
variable as a control. As we do not have the H-statistic for all the countries in our sample we 
will lose a lot of information (913 foreign bank-year observations) when we include this 
variable. We did however test whether our main results are sensitive to excluding this variable 
and this turns out not to be the case.  
 The results in Table 6 show that, after controlling for the level of income of the home 
country of the foreign bank, geographical and cultural (language) distance does matter for the 
performance of the foreign bank. Banks that are geographically and culturally close, either 
proxied by the home and host country being located in the same region or having the same 
language, have on average a higher profitability than foreign banks that are geographically 
and culturally distant. We check whether these results differ between high-income and 
developing country foreign banks but this is not the case (results not shown). Both types of 
foreign banks benefit significantly from being geographically and culturally close. Our results 
thus confirm the theoretical predictions.  
In the case of institutions, however, we do not find a significant impact of being 
familiar.13 One explanation for this finding could be that the KKM governance indicators are 
too general to capture the institutional familiarity dimensions that matter for banking. 
Therefore we estimated the same model using a number of World Bank Doing Business 
                                               
13
 We tested whether we found different results when using a continuous variable capturing institutional 
difference between host and home country. This was not the case.  
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indicators (results not shown).14 Also in this case we did not find evidence that institutional 
distance mattered. This suggests that, while geographical and cultural distance does seem to 
matter, institutional distance can be overcome by foreign banks. 
  
Foreignness and bank characteristics 
We next test whether the impact of bank characteristics on performance varies between 
foreign and domestic banks (Table 7). We run these regressions controlling for the 
development of the home country and geographical and cultural distance variables (with the 
variables significant in all specifications, except samereg which is never significant), but all 
regression results hold when excluding these variables.  
We first test whether size effects vary. We find that large foreign banks outperform 
small foreign banks as well as large and small domestic banks as the dummy for large foreign 
banks is statistically significant positive, while those for large domestic bank and small 
foreign bank are not statistically significant (missing category is small domestic bank). This 
confirms the prior that foreign banks can have some scale advantages. 
 We next investigate whether funding and asset structures matter for performance. In 
terms of funding structures, we find that foreign banks with many deposits outperform 
domestic banks and foreign banks with limited deposits. This suggests that only those foreign 
banks that have a large (and stable) local deposit base can effectively compete and be 
profitable.  
In terms of asset structure, the degree to which the bank engages in lending, we find 
no statistically significant differences in profitability between the various groups of banks. 
This may reflect offsetting effects. Foreign banks may, for example, be better in risk 
management and thus have higher profitability as they are able to make riskier, but also 
higher return loans. At the same time, foreign banks may incur higher transaction costs in 
making loans as they are less familiar with the local institutional environment. 
Next we investigate whether the time a foreign bank has been active in the host 
country has an impact on its performance. We find that foreign banks that are more than 8 
years in the country have the best performance. Compared to the other groups, profitability of 
these banks is 0.4 percentage points higher, a large difference since the overall average 
                                               
14
 Particularly, we look at the cost of registering property, legal rights index, credit information index, investor 
protection index and cost of enforcing contracts.  
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profitability is 1.6 percentage points. This suggests that over time foreign banks adapt to the 
local environment and can operate more efficiently.  
 
Summarizing, our results indicate that the relative performance of a foreign bank is affected 
by a number of factors. First, foreign banks from high income countries tend to be more 
profitable compared to domestic banks, while foreign banks from developing countries are 
less profitable. Furthermore, foreign banks entering a country where competition in the 
banking sector is limited are more profitable than foreign banks entering a country with a lot 
of competition. In addition, a foreign bank that is geographical and cultural close is more 
profitable than one that is distant. Finally, the bank’s size and time it has been present in the 
country, as well as its funding structures, are important determinants for the relative 
performance of foreign banks. Our results indicate that it is important to control for this 
heterogeneity among foreign banks when examining their relative performance.  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
Although the performance of banks when entering a foreign country has received ample 
attention in the literature, results found so far were far from univocal. In some cases foreign 
banks performed better compared to domestic banks while in other cases the reverse was 
found. This study reconciles these differences by showing that a number of factors 
importantly contribute to the relative performance of a foreign bank. Using data from a large 
number of developing countries over the 1999-2006 period, this study found strong evidence 
that the level of development in the home country, the competitiveness of the financial sector 
in the host country, the geographical and cultural distance between home and host country and 
certain bank characteristics are important determinants for the profitability of a foreign bank.  
Our results suggest that when studying the behavior of foreign banks they should not 
be looked upon as a homogeneous group. They indicate that banks from certain countries and 
with certain characteristics will be better equipped to operate in foreign countries. 
Characteristics like size, age and funding structures can influence foreign banks’ profitability. 
Furthermore, being from a home country that is closer or highly developed and/or entering a 
country with limited competition has some advantages.  
These findings have implications for the shape of the world’s financial sector going 
forward. The advantages of large foreign banks may mean a further consolidation of 
international banking systems. At the same time, the origin of banks crossing borders may 
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change over time. With a number of emerging markets becoming more and more similar to 
high-income countries and realizing that being geographical and cultural close is a major asset 
in cross-border banking, it might well be that in the future banking groups from these 
countries will start to play an increasingly important role, especially in other developing 
countries. 
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